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II. PUBLIC LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE

The Requirement of Exhausting Administrative Remedies As a
Condition to Invoking Jurisdiction of the Courts
Invoking the universally accepted principle that the courts
will not entertain a proceeding where the plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies which are available to him, the
supreme court in O'Meara v. Union Oil Company of California'
added another decision to an unbroken line of cases which have
2
been a part of Louisiana's jurisprudence for at least thirty years.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 212 La. 745, 33 So. (2d) 506 (1947).

2. The case of State ex rel. Tate v. Brooks-Scanlon Co., 143 La. 539, .78
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The rule is equally well entrenched in federal decisions, one
writer having stated that "the doctrine is as old as federal administrative law."8
In the O'Meara case the plaintiffs, oil producers, had written
the commissioner of conservation requesting the latter to hold a
public hearing for the purpose of determining whether the defendant-producer had been guilty of producing oil in excess of
allowable limits under applicable statutory provisions 4 and departmental regulations promulgated thereunder. Approximately
two months later, following the receipt of a letter from the commissioner's attorney advising that no such hearing would be held
since investigation had disclosed only minor violations which
had been corrected and would not recur, the plaintiffs again
wrote the commissioner, protesting the disposition of their previous request, renewing it and demanding to be advised whether
such a hearing would be held, or whether, in the alternative, it
would become necessary for them to initiate mandamus proceedings under the act. There was also contained in this second letter
a demand by the plaintiffs that the commissioner institute legal
proceedings against the defendant to restrain violations of the
act. In an order, dated thirteen days after the date of plaintiff's
second letter, the commissioner called a public hearing to be
held four days later "for the purpose of determining whether or
not irregularities had occurred or were occurring in the production of oil in violation of the orders of his department." 5 Three
days later, on the day before the date set for the hearing, plainSo. 847 (1918),

decided in 1918, was an early application of the principle.

There the supreme court dismissed an injunction suit seeking the restraint
of a proposed abandonment of railroad service where it was shown that
plaintiffs had failed first to seek relief at the hands of the Railroad Commission of Louisiana, an agency having the power, authority and duty to
regulate the proposed action.
Intervening cases, representing similar applications of the rule are
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 154
La. 557, 97 So. 859 (1923); Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission, 157 La. 676, 102 So. 866 (1925); Shreveport Laundries,
Inc. v. Southern Cities Distributing Co., 176 La. 994, 147 So. 56 (1933); and
Porter v. O'Neal, 205 La. 445, 17 So. (2d) 622 (1944).
3. Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1939) 48 Yale L. J.
981. In that article, the author cites Dundee Mortgage Trust Inv. Co. v.
Charlton, 32 Fed. 192 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887) as the earliest application of the
principle in the federal cases. Recent illustrations of the doctrine are to be
found In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct.
459, 82 L. Ed. 638 (1938); Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U. S. 540,
66 S. Ct. 712, 90 L. Ed. 839 (1946); Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v.
Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 67 S. Ct. 1493, 91 L. Ed. 1796 (1947).
4. La. Act 157 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4741.11-4741.31].
5. 212 La. 745, 751, 33 So. (2d) 506, 508 (1947).
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tiffs instituted their suit seeking to restrain the defendant from
its alleged violation of the statute.
The supreme court, affirming the action of the district court
in dismissing the suit, reviewed the statutory scheme of enforcement contemplated by the statute and concluded that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedy before resorting to court proceedings. The court, in passing, referred to
the broad powers of control which the legislature has vested in
the commission by Section 3 over persons and property in the
furtherance of oil and gas conservation, to the commission's
rule, regulation and order making powers conferred by Section
5, its subpoena power under Section 7 and finally, to the provisions for judicial review set forth in Section 11. It is in the
language of the latter section that the legislature has expressly
prescribed the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedy where it is provided that:
"Any interested person adversely affected by any statute
of this State with respect to conservation of oil or gas, or
both, or by any provision of this Act, or by any rule, regulation or order made by the Commissioner hereunder, or by
any act done or threatened thereunder, and who has exhausted his administrative remedy, may obtain court review
and seek relief by a suit for an injunction against the Commissioner as defendant, which suit shall be instituted in the
district court of the parish in which the principal office of
the Commissioner is located. . ....
Significantly, however, the plaintiffs were not seeking judicial
review of any action taken by the commissioner in their injunction action against the plaintiffs." Rather, it would appear that
they were pursuing another remedy conceivably open to them
under the provisions of Section 15. That section provides:
"In the event the Commissioner shall fail to bring suit within
ten (10) days to enjoin any actual or threatened violation
of any statute of this State with respect to the conservation
of oil and gas, or of any provision of this Act, or of any
6. Obviously the plaintiffs were not seeking review of the commissioners informal action of declining to hold a hearing as this was not a
matter of complaint in the pleadings, and the commissioner was not named
as defendant. In any event, the remedy for the commissioner's refusal to

schedule a hearing is a: mandamus action under Section 5(f). In this connection it is to be noted that more than thirty days had elapsed since the
plaintiffs wrote their first letter to the commissioner requesting a hearing
to be scheduled.
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rule, regulation or order made thereunder, then any person
or party in interest adversely affected by such violation, and
who has notified the Commissioner in writing of such violation, or threat thereof, and has requested the Commissioner to sue, may, to prevent any further violation, bring
suit for that purpose in the district court of any parish in
which the Commissioner could have brought suit. If, in
such suit, the court holds that injunctive relief should be
granted, then the Commissioner shall be made a party and
shall be substituted for the person who brought the suit,
and the injunction shall be issued as if the Commissioner
had at all times been the complaining party."
The facts of the case, as previously set forth, would make
it appear that in a technical, literal sense the plaintiffs had by
their second letter notified the commissioner in writing of an
actual violation and had requested him to sue for its restraint
more than ten (actually thirteen) days before filing their suit.
This theory of the case, which would have enabled the plaintiffs
to prevail, was not discussed by the court and depends for its
validity upon the conclusion that there was an "actual or threatened violation" of the statute (a fact conceded although described
as "technical" by the commissioner's attorney in his reply to
the plaintiffs' first letter).
Rather, the court (again without expressly so stating)
seemed to construe the plaintiffs' second letter as a kind of request for reconsideration by the commissioner of his previous
informal disposition of plaintiffs' earlier demand for a hearing,
which, when favorably acted upon by the issuance of an order
calling for a hearing, served to keep the administrative process
in progress (or possibly to revive it). Viewed in this perspective,
there was an administrative proceeding in progress which might
have afforded the plaintiffs the remedy they were seeking, and
under the established principle requiring its exhaustion (fortified
in this case by the express terms of the statute-Section 11), the
plaintiffs' suit was fatally premature.
The desirability of the result is unquestioned,
court observed, it permits "placing the preliminary
cess of matters peculiarly within the competence of
istrative authority in the conservation commissioner
prevent attempts to swamp the court by resorting
the first instance."

for, as the
sifting prothe adminwhich will
to them in
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Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings
The decisions in Continental Insurance Company v. Martin7
and De Latour v. Morrison,8 both of which were actions to enjoin
administrative officials from pursuing pre-determined courses of
action, are specific illustrations of the extent to which, if at all,
a party who is dissatisfied with the conclusions reached by an
administrative agency in the course of its proceedings may hope
for a different result at the hands of the judiciary. Each, on its
own facts, makes a contribution to the definition of the scope
of judicial review of administrative proceedings, by indicating
the nature of the questions which may be raised in the course of
such review, and the treatment to be accorded them.
In the Continental case the court was asked to restrain the
secretary of state (as insurance commissioner) from issuing a
certificate to a foreign corporation qualifying it to do business
in Louisiana on the ground that the applicant's name was "deceptively similar to" that of plaintiff's within the meaning of
a 19469 statute proscribing the use by any insurance company in
the state of a name similar to that of another. It appeared that
the secretary's decision to issue the certificate had been reached
following a hearing at which both companies appeared by counsel and presented evidence and oral argument. The court, observing that under the statute in question "the Secretary of State is
granted some discretion," 10 and that the court "should not and
must not interfere with that official in carrying out his announced intention of issuing the certificate of authority to the
Texas company unless the record discloses an abuse of the
power granted him,"" proceeded to review the record and finding no such abuse, affirmed the decision of the trial court in
7. 213 La. 147, 34 So. (2d) 405 (1948).
8. 213 La. 292, 34 So. (2d) 783 (1948).
9. La. Act 116 of 1946, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4023.1] reading in part
as follows: "That the corporate name of any insurance company organized
under the laws of this State or any foreign insurance company desiring to
qualify to do business in this State shall not be the same as, nor deceptively
similar to, the name of any other domestic insurance corporation or of any
"
foreign insurance corporation authorized to do business in this State ..
This act, although not expressly amendatory of La. Act 105 of 1898,
§ 2, Art. II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4019] and itself making no provision for
issuance of certificate as the latter statute does, was nevertheless construed
by the court to be in part nateriawith the earlier statute so as to constitute
an additional one of "the laws of this state" with which the secretary must
find the applicant has complied before issuing the certificate provided for
in the earlier statute authorizing the conduct of business.
10. 34 So. (2d) 405, 407 (La. 1948).
11. Ibid.
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dismissing the action. In view of the facts of the case and the
nature of the issue presented, it would appear that the court's
decision is clearly sound. It is to be noted that the plaintiff
raised no constitutional issues, either with respect to the substantive validity of the statute 1 2 under which the secretary of
state was acting, or with respect to procedural steps" utilized
by him in coming to his conclusion. "Rather," in the language
of the court, "appellant relies entirely on Act 116 of 1946 which
forbids the issuance of a certificate of authority to any insurance
company having a corporate name the same as or deceptively
similar to the name of any other insurance company presently
authorized to do business in this state." There was thus presented for the court's consideration what was essentially a question of the fact and the decision is indicative of the normal reluctance of courts to superimpose their views upon those of an
administrative tribunal vested by the legislature with the power
to make the initial determination based upon its prior knowledge and experience in such matters. To the extent to which
the secretary of state's determination involved a question of
law, the proper interpretation and construction of the statute
in question, the court, affirming what was apparently a similar
construction placed upon it by the secretary of state, concluded
that "the Legislature . . . intended, unquestionably, to provide
protection against deception arising out of the use of similar
names. And this protection, we think, is primarily for the benefit of the public generally" and not for the protection of exist4
ing and qualified companies.1
In the De Latour case,' 5 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
mayor and commission council of New Orleans from enforcing
a zoning ordinance, reclassifying the plaintiff's property, which
had been adopted by the commission without giving the plaintiff notice of or an opportunity to be heard at the proceedings in
which the measure was adopted. It was contended that the commission council had thereby denied the plaintiff due process and
equal protection of the law contrary to the State and Federal
Constitutions. From the decision it appears that the plaintiff's
property, previously classified "residential," had been properly
12. Cf. State v. Maitrejean, 193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939).
13. This was the Issue in De Latour v. Morrison, 213 La. 292, 34 So. (2d)
783 (1948), which is discussed below.
14. It is to be observed (as the court noted) that plaintiff raised no
issue of unfair competition in the case. On this general question see annotation in 66 A. L. R. 948, 1021 (1930).
15. 213 La. 292, 34 So. (2d) 783 (1948).
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reclassified "commercial" property as the result of the adoption
of an ordinance on May 3, 1946. Under the commission's own
rules of procedure no amendment or other change could be
made in the zoning law until it had been posted and advertised
for a period of thirty days. Two weeks later, on May 17, 1946,
a new commission council which had taken office in the interim,
adopted a new ordinance, repealing the one which had been
adopted on May 3, 1946, which, if effective, operated to reclassify
the plaintiff's property to the residential classification which it
had held prior to the enactment of the May 3, 1946, ordinance.
The May 17, 1946, ordinance was adopted without observance
of the thirty-day posting and advertising requirement, and
apparently without any notice whatsoever to the plaintiff. Its
adoption was defended, first, on a mistaken construction of the
commission council's rules which the court rejected and which
is not material here, and second, on the broader ground that the
council having been granted authority by the legislature by Act
27 of 1918 and Act 240 of 1926 to zone such property, it was not
bound by the restrictive conditions of notice which the previous
council's rules had imposed on that power. With respect to this
latter contention, the court said:
"Conceding that the city had authority under the acts of
Legislature relied on and by the exercise of its police power
to adopt the repealing ordinance, an unreasonable and arbitrary action on the part of the commission council in adopting the repealing ordinance without granting the appellee
the notice and hearing granted others in like situations would
be violative of appellee's constitutional rights. The appellee
cannot be singled out and dealt with in a manner different
from that afforded others in like situations."
Upon this reasoning the court affirmed the action of the district
judge annulling the ordinance and enjoining its enforcement,
holding that the commission council's disregard for its own procedural rules constituted a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by both State" and Federal 7 Constitutions. The decision
appeals to the reader's sense of justice and while there is a dearth
of case material on the issue, it seems to be adequately supported
by precedent. The scanty jurisprudence on the subject indicates
that courts have viewed non-observance by an administrative
agency of its own rules of procedure as a denial of due process,
16. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2.
17. U. S. Const., Fourteenth Amend.
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even though the total absence of a similar rule would not be
regarded as an infringement upon constitutional guarantees.'
In this respect, it is submitted that as an original proposition the
commission council might have refrained from adopting the
notice provision in its rules of procedure and proceeded to enact
zoning ordinances without constitutional objection. 19
There is respectable authority for the view that municipal
legislative bodies made up of representatives chosen by the electorate are, in proper cases, to be accorded the same immunity
enjoyed by the legislature in the matter of affording notice to
persons affected by its acts although ordinary administrative
agencies may not be accorded a similar freedom. Thus in Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Nebraska,20 the Supreme Court of the United
States sustained, against the same constitutional attack made
here, the action of a city council in enacting an ordinance without
notice to the affected railroad, apportioning the cost of constructing railroad viaduct crossings, where the power to do so had been
delegated to the council by the state legislature. The same court,
thirty-five years later, without overruling its previous decision,
refused to accord a like immunity upon a non-elected, purely
administrative highway commissioner in Southern Railway v.
Virginia.21
Laying to one side, therefore, the question whether as a strict
matter of compliance with constitutional provisions the council
had to adopt the notice feature which was a part of its ordinancemaking procedure (as the court by its concession seems to have
done), there remains for consideration the question whether the
council's disregard of such procedural rule, once actually adopted,
is a denial of due process of law (which the court resolved in the
affirmative).
18. See Gellhorn, Administrative

Law

Cases and

Comments

(2

ed.

1947) 442-451.
19. Constitutional questions aside, there may have been other doubts
raised over the validity of such procedure in view of the applicable statutory
provisions pursuant to which the commission council acted. Act 240 of 1926

imposed an affirmative

thirty-day notice provision, which, if applicable,

would have invalidated the ordinance in

question on the ground that the

council had not proceeded under the procedural terms of the legislative
grant of power. Cf. Johnson v. Mayor and City Commission of City of
Natchitoches, 129 So. 433 (La. App. 1930). Doubt arises concerning the ap-

plicability of the notice provision of the 1926 act, however, in view of the
fact that it carried the proviso that no repeal of Act 27 of 1918 was intended, and that former act, applicabld to New Orleans, contained no notice
provision.
20. 170 U. S. 57, 18 S. Ct. 513, 42 L. Ed. 948 (1898).
21. 290 U. S. 190, 54 S. Ct. 148, 78 L. Ed. 260 (1933),
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In a strikingly similar case 22 a New Jersey court reached
the same conclusion in 1910 even though it appeared that the
party challenging the irregularly adopted ordinance had not in
fact been harmed by the administrative irregularity. There
would seem to be less reason for invalidating the action of the
administrative agency in cases where the non-observance of its
rules have worked no actual prejudice upon the individuals
whose interests were designed to be protected by it. In the
De Latour case, the plaintiff was clearly one of the persons sought
to be protected by the rule, and furthermore, on the facts disclosed, he was actually prejudiced by the non-observance. The
principle has been applied in a number of alien deportation proceeding cases in the federal courts, 2 3 the most recent and famous
of which is Bridges v. Wixon.24 There the Supreme Court of the
United States declared invalid an order for the deportation of
Harry Bridges when it was shown that the order had been
entered following a hearing in which testimony forbidden by
the rules of the administrative agency had been admitted.
As was observed at the outset of this discussion, the decisions
in the Continental and De Latour cases make substantial contributions to the jurisprudence of Louisiana in the realm of
administrative law. They are illustrative of two, and possibly
three, of what another writer has described as "the ends to be
' 25
achieved by judicial review of administrative action.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Due Process-The Unfair Sales Act
In Louisiana Wholesale DistributorsAssociation Incorporated
v. Rosenzweig,' the court sustained the Unfair Sales Act 2 against
constitutional attack founded upon the claim that the statute deprived the defendant of due process and equal protection of law
22. Erie R. R. Co. v. Paterson, 79 N.J.L. 512, 76 Atl. 1065 (1910).
23. United States v. Perkins, 79 Fed. (2d) 533 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935); Sibray
v. United States, 282 Fed. 795 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1922); Mah Shee v. White, 242
Fed. 868 (C.C.A. 9th, 1917); United States v. Dunton, 288 Fed. 959 (D.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1923); Ex parte Radivoeff, 278 Fed. 227 (D.C.D. Mont. 1922).
24. 326 U. S. 135, 65 S. Ct. 1443, 89 L. Ed. 2103 (1945).
25. Merrill, Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings, A Functional
Prospectus (1944) 23 Neb. L. Rev. 56.
1. 36 So. (2d) 403 (La. 1948).
2. La. Act 338 of 1940, as amended by La. Act 79 of 1942 and La. Act 256
of 1946 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 4931.1 et seq.]. For a discussion of the
details of the legislation see (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 277.
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guaranteed by the State 3 and Federal 4 Constitutions. A dissenting opinion was filed by Chief Justice O'Niell. In view of the
fact, observed by the court, that courts of last resort in at least
ten of the more than thirty states having similar legislative enactments had previously rejected similar contentions of invalidity, the decision seems not destined to provoke extensive comment.
The Louisiana act, like those of her sister states, is an attempt
by the legislature to protect the public against the harmful influences which are said to result from the destructive competitive
practice known as the sale of the "loss leader." Through the
device of prohibiting the sale of merchandise at a price below
cost,5 the public, while denied an immediate cash benefit on
such sales, is nevertheless the beneficiary of the legislative paternalism in at least two other respects. First, it is protected
against its own cupidity by the savings it realizes in not making
other unwanted and higher-than-cost-to-make-up-the-difference
purchases of items from the merchant who has used the "loss
leader" device as "bait" to tempt the unwary purchaser into his
place of business. Second, the public is also said to obtain protection against the economic dislocations resulting from the completely effectual utilization of the "loss leader" technique to the
extent that the statute forestalls bankruptcy of the small businessman and the monopolistic concentration of business in his successful competitor.
Fourteen years ago the Supreme Court of the United States6
had taken a similar view to that expressed in this case insofar as the same claim of invalidity (due process) was made
respecting a statute of the New York legislature authorizing the
fixing of milk prices. In its decision, however, the court was at
pains to restrict its consideration of the statute within the
bounds of the attack which was laid wholly upon the proposition
that the statute infringed the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Similarly,
3. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2.
4. The court's opinion indicates that the defendant asserted protection
under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
of the United States. Since the case was concerned solely with state legislative action it is clear that the Fourteenth, not the Fifth, is the only provision even arguably applicable to the proceedings, and the court restricted its
opinion to a consideration of that amendment.
5. The term "cost" is defined with varying degrees of definiteness in the
statutes of the several states. For the Louisiana provision consult Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 4931.2.
6. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934).
7. One of the critical passages of the opinion which is illustrative reads:
'So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence
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in the Rosenzweig case the Louisiana court, in a well written
opinion by Justice Fournet (citing the Nebbia case) restricted
itself to a consideration of that issue.
It has recently been observed8 that litigation undertaken by
the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, however, suggests that legislation of this
kind may ultimately prove to be offensive to another provision
of the Federal Constitution, not heretofore asserted by way of
defense in the course of enforcement proceedings in state courts.
In proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, an association of candy manufacturers and sellers was restrained from
making further efforts to fix and enforce prices, which though
proper under the California statute (which does not define "cost"
in terms similar to the Louisiana act but authorizes cost surveys
for this purpose) was found by the commission to constitute
price fixing as prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.9 In a group of New England cases, all involving
action taken under state statutes defining the term "cost" in substantially the same manner as the Louisiana act by requiring
designated mark-ups, the Justice Department obtained four consent decrees predicated upon the allegations that action taken by
the food councils involved in bringing actions against violators
and warning others against violation of the provisions of the
state acts constituted these councils combinations in restraint of
trade under the Sherman Act.' 0
Contested litigation has not proceeded to a point where definite conclusions may be drawn" but there is implicit in the
proceedings thus far undertaken the suggestion that state legislaof other constitutional restriction,a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it." (Italics supplied.)
8. Lovell, Sales Below Cost: Private Price Fixing Under State Law
(1938) 57 Yale L. J. 391.
9. Western Confectioners Association, Inc., 34 F. T. C. 1431 (1942).
See also Wholesale Liquor Distributors Ass'n. of Northern California Inc.,
Liquor Trades' Stabilization Bureau, Inc. 31 F. T. C. 1453 (1940).
10. United States v. Connecticut Food Council, Civil Action No. 680 (D.
Conn., Nov. 5, 1941); United States v. Massachusetts Food Council, 2 P-H
Trade & Ind. Serv. Par. 27, 460 (D. Mass, 1941); United States v. Maine Food
Council, 2 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. Par. 8348.15 (D. Me., 1941); United States
v. Rhode Island Food Council, 2 C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. Par. 8748.10-40
(D.R.I. 1941).
11. Cf. California Retail Grocers & Merchants Ass'n. Limited v. United
States, 139 F. (2d) 978 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) and United States v. Food & Grocery
Bureau of Southern California, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 966 (S.D. Cal. 1942) affirmed
139 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943).
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tion of the character involved in the Rosenzweig case could be
found to be in conflict with one or more of the "laws of the
United States" and for that reason invalid under Article VI,
Clause 2, of the Federal Constitution.
Due Process-PrivateProperty Taken for Public Purposes
For a period of more than twenty years the jurisprudence of
Louisiana has been substantially unsettled as a consequence of
a series of conflicting decisions interpreting and applying that
phrase of Article I, Section 2, of the State Constitution of 1921
reading, "private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after just and adequate compensation is paid." The decision in Angelle v. State12 imposing a narrower construction than most of the earlier cases, may bring an
end to any continuing doubts concerning its limits. Angelle
brought his suit against the state to recover the value of a quantity of sweet potatoes, destroyed by fire arising through negligence of state employees in the course of their duties of spraying
by
them as required by statute.13 Separate suits were also filed
14
others who likewise suffered losses as a result of the fire.
The claims of all plaintiffs were denied, the court adopting
the view that the constitutional provision quoted above applies
"only to cases where the taking or damaging of the private property is intentional or occurs as a necessary consequence of the
public undertaking" with the logical corollary that "damage to
private property which occurs solely as a result of negligence
and not as a necessary consequence of the public work fits nowhere within the realm of eminent domain and the courts are
without jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this sort against the
sovereign." In reaching this conclusion, which the court properly
regarded to be in accord with the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court under the Fifth Amendment,' 5 it was recognized
12. 212 La. 1069, 34 So. (2d) 321 (1948).
13. La. Act 314 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 169 et seq.]
14. Roy v. State and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State, both of which were
consolidated with Angefle's case for decision in the supreme court. 212 La.
1069, 34 So. (2d) 321 (1948).
15. The court cited and relied upon Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v.
United States, 260 U. S. 125, 43 S.Ct. 37, 67 L.Ed. 165 (1922); United States v.
North American Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U. S. 330, 40 S.Ct. 518, 64
L.Ed. 635 (1920); Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 39 S.Ct. 56, 63 L.Ed. 162
(1918); Hughes v. United States, 230 U. S. 24, 33 S.Ct. 1019, 57 L.Ed. 1374
(1913); United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 23 S.Ct. 349, 47 L.Ed. 539 (1903);
Bigby v. United States, 188 U. S. 400, 23 S.Ct. 468, 47 L.Ed. 519 (1903); United
States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645, 5 S.Ct. 306, 28 L.Ed. 846 (1884);
Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 25 L.Ed. 1010 (1880).
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that the result was incompatible with much that had been said
as well as decided in earlier cases. 16 In the course of analyzing
the earlier cases in the light of the newly formulated rule, the
court showed that only one 17 of the five previous decisions was
correctly decided upon principle, that another' was properly
decided upon erroneous reasoning, that a third 9 could be explained by a controlling statute and that the remaining two20
were incorrectly decided-at least as to specific items of damage
allowed. Of the three courts of appeal cases, one 21 was correctly
22
decided upon erroneous reasoning, and the remaining two

were wrongly decided.
Justice Hamiter in his dissent emphasizes the fundamental
weakness of the majority opinion when he points out that it
relies principally for support upon the federal cases interpreting
the Fifth Amendment which does not contain the critical word
"damaged" found in the Louisiana Constitution. There is admitted force in his argument. The opinion of the majority, without discussing this issue, stresses the extent to which the sovereign would be stripped of its immunity to tort litigation if the
claims were to be sustained. Since this may very well be one of
the objectives which the constitutional framers had in mind, it
serves only to beg the question to so observe the consequences.
As a result of the decision, a person whose property (or person)
is damaged by the negligence of state employees will be without redress as a matter of right. 23 The rigor of such a predica16. These cases, representing decisions of the supreme court as well as

the courts of appeal are: Green v. Board of Com'rs, 163 La. 117, 111 So. 619
(1927); McGeehan
DeMoss v. Police
336 (1928); Booth
169 (1931); Nagle

v. Board of Levee Com'rs, 165 La. 241, 115 So. 473 (1928);
Jury of Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700, 68 A.L.R.
v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 171 La. 1096, 133 So.
v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425

(1932); Murff v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 19 La. App. 847, 140 So.
863 (1932); Cope v. Louisiana State Livestock Sanitary Board, 176 So. 657
(La. App. 1937); and Pelt v. Louisiana State Livestock Sanitary Board, 178
So. 644 (La. App. 1938).
17. McGeehan v. Board of Levee Com'rs, 165 La. 241, 115 So. 473 (1928).
18. Booth v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 171 La. 1096, 133 So. 169
(1931).
19. DeMoss v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700, 68
A.L.R. 336 (1928).
20. Green v. Board of Com'rs, 163 La. 117, 111 So. 619 (1927); Nagle v.
Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932).
21. Murff v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 19 La. App. 847, 144 So.
863 (1932).
22. Cope v. Louisiana Livestock Sanitary Board and Pelt v. Louisiana
Livestock Sanitary Board, 176 So. 657 (La. App. 1937).
23. Such persons may solicit legislative authority to initiate legal proceedings against the state under the provisions of La. Const. of 1921, Art.
III, § 35. In this connection the case of Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., Inc. v.
State, 213 La. 1, 34 So. (2d) 331 (1947) is of interest, holding that a bill, passed
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ment has recently been ameliorated in the federal field by congressional enactment of the Federal Tort Claim Act. 24 Until
Louisiana's legislature deems it advisable to adopt similar legislation, litigants like Angelle will be met with the short, noncompensating answer-the sovereign is immune from suit.
Due Process-Free Speech
Following his arrest and conviction under a New Orleans
ordinance prohibiting the distribution in the public streets of
"any dodgers or hand advertisements, whether of a theatrical
nature or otherwise," the defendant, who had circulated literature proclaiming certain aspects of communism, appealed to the
supreme court which annulled the action of the lower court.25
In a very brief opinion for a unanimous court, Justice McCaleb
stated first, that Hood's activities were not within the scope of
the ordinance which was construed to apply to "commercial"
rather than political circulars, and, second, that the ordinance,
if construed to be applicable to Hood's activities, would be an invalid abridgement of free speech contrary to Article I, Section
3, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the State and Federal Constitutions, respectively. Counsel for the city in addition to contending that Hood's activities were within the reach of the
ordinance, sought to sustain its validity as a proper police
measure in the interest of keeping the streets clean. A similar
contention had been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1939, when in deciding Schneider v. State2
Mr. Justice Roberts said:
"We are of the opinion that the purpose to keep the streets
clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an
ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public
street from handing literature to one willing to receive it.
Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning
and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such
distribution results from the constitutional protection of the
freedom of speech and press. This constitutional protection
does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street littering. There are obvious methods of preventing littering.
in both houses and referred to the governor, but vetoed by him, is nevertheless a sufficient authorization by the "legislature" for the institution of suit
under Art. III, § 35.
24. Pub. L. No. 601, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 921-946 (1946).
25. City of New Orleans v. Hood, 212 La. 485, 32 So. (2d) 899 (1947).
26. 308 U. S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155 (1939).
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Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually
'27
throw papers on the streets.
In the face of such controlling authority, and in the absence
of a more clearly defined legislative purpose, there seems to be
no reason to question the result.
Due Process-Right to Notice and Opportunity to be Heard in
Administrative Proceedings
For the purpose of grouping cases to give consideration to
judicial review of administrative proceedings the case of DeLatour v. Morrison28 is discussed in the section on administrative
law.
Equal Protection-Reasonablenessof Classification.
Defendants in three criminal cases 29 which were reviewed
by the court sought to avoid the consequences of the acts charged
by attributing unreasonableness of classification and consequent
denial of equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the legislation prescribing the offenses. The court encountered no difficulty in rejecting the defenses in the first two
30
cases. In City of Shreveport v. Conrad,
it saw nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in the action of a municipal council in adopting an ordinance designed to protect the city's water supply
from pollution and contamination, which on the one hand, forbade aircraft from flying lower than 1000 feet above or landing
upon the surface of a lake (constituting the water supply) but
which, on the other hand, did nothing to prohibit the free and
uncontrolled use of motor boats on the same lake. A similar contention was likewise rejected by a unanimous court in State v.
Saia 3l where the defendant, charged with operating a betting
book for horse races thereby engaging in gambling as prohibited
by Article 90 of the Criminal Code, took refuge in the assertion
that the State Racing Commission Act3 2 legalizing "the bookmaking form of wagering [when restricted] ...to a space within
the race meeting grounds, '3 3 was an unreasonable and arbitrary
27. 308 U. S. 107, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155, 165.
28. 213 La. 292, 34 So. (2d) 783 (1948).
29. City of Shreveport v. Conrad, 212 La. 737, 33 So. (2d) 503 (1947); State
v. Saia, 212 La. 868, 33 So. (2d) 665 (1947) and State v. Trahan, 36 So. (2d)
652 (La. 1948).
30. 212 La. 737, 33 So. (2d) 503 (1948).
31. 212 La.. 868, 33 So. (2d) 665 (1948).
32. La. Act 276 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 9670.1 et seq.].
33. Id. at § 7.
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discrimination against persons situated, like the defendant, outside the race track enclosure and hence constituted an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. While the reader may
share the same "grave doubt" expressed by the court concerning
the defendant's standing collaterally to challenge the validity of
the latter statute under which no charges were laid, the decision
on the merits commends itself as one of those instances in which
"The power of the State 'may be determined by degrees of
evil or exercised in cases where detriment is specially experienced.' -14
In the third case in the group, State v. Trahan,85 the court
had considerably greater difficulty in overcoming the defendant's
equal protection objection to the statute. There the defendant,
a restaurant owner, was convicted of violating the Sunday law, 6
enacted in 1886, by having sold a glass of wine to a customer on
Sunday. He appealed contending that the statute denied him
equal protection since it permits, by way of exception, "hotels or
boarding-houses to sell . . . wine for table use 7 on Sunday. 'a8
The court, following the initial hearing in a four to two decision
with one judge absent, sustained the defendant's contention observing that while reason for the discrimination may have existed
at the time the statute was enacted in 1886, changing social and
economic conditions had so far altered the picture today to make
present application of the discriminatory provisions unconstitutional. 9 Justices Hawthorne and McCaleb dissented, the latter
writing an opinion in which, seizing upon the majority's concession that the statute was constitutional when originally enacted,
he demonstrated that the decision was a usurpation of legislative
power on the part of the judiciary. In effect, as Justice McCaleb's
opinion forcefully indicates, the court had placed itself in the
34. Holmes, J., in Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 268, 39 S.Ct.
273, 274, 63 L.Ed. 597 (1919).
35. 36 So. (2d) 652 (La. 1948).
36. La. Act 18 of 1886 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) § 1174 et seq.].
37. The defendant showed that he had sold the patron a sandwich along
with the glass of wine.
38. La. Act 18 of 1886, § 3 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) § 1176].
39. The decision reads in part as follows: "A possible reason for this
discrimination may have existed in 1886, when the statute was passed, because in general at that time only those persons living In hotels and boarding houses ate there, while restaurants were patronized by the general public.
Today, however, the general public patronizes hotels as much as, if not more
than, the persons who live in them and it is becoming quite common for
boarding houses to serve meals to the public. Therefore, there is no way
under present conditions to distinguish the circumstances surrounding the
serving of wine with a meal in a restaurant from the serving of wine with
a meal in a hotel or a boarding house."
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position of the legislature to pass judgment upon the policy of
continuing the 1886 statute in operation or to repeal or otherwise
modify it. The justice's statement that "This reasoning is novel
to say the least" finds implied support in the dearth of case law
on the issue. A dictum from the Supreme Court of the United
States in Lindsley v. NaturalCarbonic Gas Company,40 lends support to Justice McCaleb's views where, in discussing the principles to be applied to the defense of equal protection, it is stated
41
that "facts at the time the law was enacted" govern.
Following a rehearing, the views of Justice McCaleb prevailed and he wrote the opinion for a unanimous court rejecting
the equal protection defense. The decision seems wholly sound,
properly reserving to the legislature the question of resolving
when, if at all, one of its enactments, admittedly valid when
made, has served its purpose and may be withdrawn.
Impairing Obligation of Contract
In Martin v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of Town of Westwego42 the plaintiffs secured an injunction restraining the de-

fendant town-officials from selling an issue of bonds, the proceeds of which they proposed to use for the purpose of refunding
(at lower interest rates) bonds previously issued for fixed terms
which made no provision for refunding procedure. To permit the
refunding operation, said the court, would lead to the impairment
of the contract existing between the town and its prior bondholders, contrary to provisions of both State43 and Federal 44 Constitutions. The soundness of the position seems unquestioned, as
well it might have been were it not for the fact that the defendants sought to justify their proposed action on the terms of
40. 220 U. S. 61, 7&-79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911).
41. The complete enumeration of the principles set forth in the opinion
(by Mr. Justice Van Devanter) is as follows: "1. The equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide

scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is
without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is
called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the t4me the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a
law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any rea-

sonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." (Italics supplied.)
42. 212 La. 439, 32 So. (2d) 711 (1947).

43. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 15.
44. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. IX

another provision of the State Constitution expressly authorizing
refunding operations, Article 14, Section 14 (g), which was added
by way of amendment in 1934.45 The court relied upon and quoted
at length from the decision of United States District Judge Porterie who had considered the identical issue in Kansas City Life
Insurance Company v. Evangeline Parish School Board.46 In that
case the later constitutional provision was construed, in the light
of contemporaneous economic circumstances existing at the time
of its adoption, simply to excuse the necessity for an election at
a time when governmental subdivisions were encountering difficulties in meeting payments on their bonded debt. It was regarded as permitting "refunding only where the bonds to be revolfunded are available for cancellation either because of their
47
untary surrender or by reason of their having come due.
The result seems to be a wholly proper one, not only with
respect to the true meaning of the later amendment, but also
in keeping with the principle that separate provisions of a constitution are to be construed so as to avoid conflict between them.
LEGISLATION

In four cases decided at the last term, the court had occasion
to invoke recognized principles of statutory interpretation in the
course of applying the terms of legislation to disputes arising
thereunder.'
2
St. Martin ParishPolice Jury v. Iberville Parish Police Jury
was a dispute in which the two parishes were unable to agree
upon the proper interpretation of an 1847 statutes fixing the
boundary lines between them. The controversy centered about
the proper interpretation of one call in the description involving
a water course which used the expression "thence following said
branch, including the inhabitants of both sides thereof." In all
other instances where water courses were fixed as the dividing
line between the two parishes, the statute uses the language
45. Proposed by La. Act 85 of 1934 and adopted November 6, 1934.
46. 58 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. La., 1944) aftrmed 153 F(2d) 611 (C.C.A. 5th,

1946).,
47. 153 F. (2d) 611, 612.
1. St. Martin Parish Police Jury v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 212 La.
886, 33 So. (2d) 671 (1947); Dresser v. Recreation and Park Commission of
Parish of East Baton Rouge, 213 La. 85, 34 So. (2d) 384 (1948); Roberts v.
Caddo Parish School Board, 213 La. 436, 34 So. (2d)

Baggott. 212 La. 795, 33 So. (2d) 523 (1948).
2. 212 La. 886, 33 So. (2d) 671 (1947).
3. La. Act 130 of 1847.

916 (1948);

State v.
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"thence along the middle of" such stream, bayou, river, et cetera.
The court was unanimous in the conviction that the controversial
call, by thus changing the descriptive language used elsewhere
in the act, reflected a legislative intention to fix a different type
of boundary along this particular water course, and, further, that
in the course of giving effect to every provision in a statute, the
court, rather than treating it as surplusage, should ascertain that
intention and give it application if at all possible. Likewise, it was
agreed that the phrase "including the inhabitants on both sides"
of the water course, as set forth in the English text, was essentially meaningless insofar as it establishes a geographical area.
There was further agreement among the members of the court
that where the acts of the legislature were printed and published
both in English and in French, the English text was to prevail
over the French in cases where the meaning was clear, but if
might be made
found not to be wholly unambiguous, that resort
4
to the French text to resolve the uncertainty.
Further accord among the justices proved impossible, however, due to differences between them over the proper translation and interpretation of the French text. The majority adopting a translation in which the French word "habitations" (counterpart of "inhabitants" appearing in the English text) was taken
to mean "plantations," proceeded to fix the boundary along a
line which gave to Iberville Parish all the territory comprising
the plantations fronting on both sides of the water course as they
existed at the time of the legislation. The dissenting justices
(Fournet, O'Niell and McCaleb) basing their opinions upon different translations of the French text felt that the case was
wrongly decided.
Ultimate appraisal of the decision would seem to be a task
for the linguists. Insofar as principles of statutory construction
are involved, with respect to which the court was in full accord,
the case appears to be properly decided.
Dresser v. Recreation and Park Commission of Parish of East
Baton Rouge5 was a case in which the court quite properly applied the principle in pari materia. At its 1946 session the legislature by Act 246 had provided for the creation of the defendant
commission, to be operative upon the adoption of a constitutional
amendment proposed during the same session by the adoption
4. The court here cited and followed the case of Parish of Lafourche
v. Parish of Terrebonne, 34 La. Ann. 1230 (1882).

5. 213 La. 85, 34 So. (2d) 384 (1948).
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of Act 387 (subsequently adopted as Section 3 (b) of Article
XIV). Plaintiffs, resident property owners, attacked the validity
of an election held under the amendment and all proceedings of
the defendant pursuant thereto on the ground that the language
of the provision failed to fix the identity and requisite majority
of voters who were to authorize the assumption and service of
indebtedness by defendant, that is, whether (1) the voters were
to be property owners or others, and (2) whether the majority
required for approval were to be a majority of all property owners (whether voting or not) or simply a majority of those voting.
The amendment, adopting Act 347, refers at one point to "a majority in number and amount of the public tax payers of the parish" and at another to "a majority in number and amount of the
duly qualified tax payers." (Italics supplied.) Reference to the
earlier act of the same legislature, Act 246, disclosed however,
that the lawmakers had employed language in Section 9 which
.resolved the ambiguity by providing "That no tax of any kind
shall be levied and no bonds shall be issued hereunder until
they have been authorized by both a majority in number and
amount of the property tax payers qualified to vote under the
Constitution and the laws of this state who vote at an election
held hereunder." (Italics supplied.)
The doctrine of in pari materia, permitting resort to other
statutes on the same general subject matter when the terms of
a particular enactment are ambiguous had unquestionable application to this case, 6 in view of the fact that the two acts in
question were essentially concurrent and were specifically re7
lated to the same subject.
Roberts v. Caddo Parish School Board8 was a case in which
the court dismissed a contention that a statute 9 failed to meet
the constitutional requirement ° that "Every law . . . shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such
object," saying that "It is not required that it [the title] be a
complete' index to every section of the statute and whatever is
germane or incidental to the purpose need not be embraced
therein." The decision is in complete accord with prior Louisiana
jurisprudence which the court cited, as well as authorities else6.

Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack's 3 ed.) § 5201 et seq.
7. As a matter of fact, Section 11 of Act 246 makes specific reference to
the constitutional amendment by section and article numbers.
8. 213 La. 436, 34 So. (2d), 916 (1948).
9. La. Act 152 of 1920 [Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 2293-2296].
10. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16.

1949]

WORK OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

173

where." On another phase of the same case, a less frequently
mooted principle was affirmed, namely, that curative legislation
does not operate prospectively. 12 As a consequence the action of
the defendant in creating a consolidated school district in 1946,
contrary to the provisions of a 1920 statute, was invalidated notwithstanding the fact that other districts similarly irregularly
created prior to 1940 had been retroactively "legalized" by the
enactment of a curative statute."
The decision in State v. Baggott14 is an illustration of the
salvaging characteristics of the so-called separability clauses
commonly appended to legislation as a matter of modern draftsmanship. There the defendant was convicted of making false
answers enabling him to vote in a primary election. Pursuant to
the statute 15 under which the proceedings were had, the trial
court, in imposing sentence ordered the payment of a fine, a
prison term and declared the defendant to be "ineligible for four
years thereafter to be employed by the state or any of its political
subdivisions or any board, department or commission thereof
either as officer or employee thereof."
Seeking reversal of his conviction on appeal, defendant
urged, upon the authority of State v. Gravolet,16 that the disfranchisement provision of the statute was unconstitutional. The
court, agreeing that the controverted provision was invalid, nevertheless sustained the conviction and the sentence insofar as it
imposed a fine and imprisonment, relying upon the separability
section 7 of the act of which it was a part, and struck down only
so much of the sentence that related to disfranchisement. 8 In
11. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack's 3 ed. 1943) c. 17. See
also with reference to this point the court's decision at last term in State v.
Trahan, 36 So. (2d) 652 (La. 1948) discussed in the section on constitutional
law, supra p. 168.
12. Id. at 2214.
13. La. Act 313 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 2336.15].
14. 212 La. 795, 33 So. (2d) 523 (1948).
15. La. Act 46 of 1940, § 89. The disfranchisement provision of the section
was repealed in 1946. La. Act 221 of 1946, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) §
2682.93].
16. 168 La. 648, 123 So. 111 (1929).
17. La. Act 46 of 1940, § 104 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 2682.108], which
reads as follows: "If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this Act
shall, for any reason, be adjudged by any Court of competent jurisdiction
to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of this Act, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause,
sentence, paragraph or any part thereof, directly involved in the controversy
in which such judgment has been rendered."
18. On the constitutional point the consistent jurisprudence of the state
[State v. Gravolet, 168 La. 648, 123 So. 111 (1929) and State v. Dunson, 138
La. 131, 70 So. 61 (1915)], has been to recognize the provisions of Sections
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thus giving effect to the separability section of the act in question, the court, by dictum, stated it to be "the general rule that,
in the absence of a savings clause, courts will not attempt to
separate unconstitutional provisions of a statute from those considered valid," citing Carter v. Carter Coal Company.19
It is the writer's opinion that this dictum, although the actual
basis of decision in two of the court's previous cases, 20 is erroneous and that Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion in the Carter
case, cited by the court, demonstrates its fallacy where, in discussing separability clauses, it was stated:
"In the absence of such a provision, the presumption is
that the Legislature intends an act to be effective as an entirety-that is to say, the rule is against the mutilation of a
statute; and if any provision be unconstitutional, the presumption is that the remaining provisions fall with it. The
effect of the statute is to reverse this presumption in favor
of inseparability, and create the opposite one of separability.
Under the nonstatutory rule, the burden is upon the supporter of the legislation to show the separability of the provisions involved. Under the statutory rule, the burden is
shifted to the assailant to show their inseparability. But
under either rule, the determination, in the end, is reached
by applying the same test-namely, what was the intent of
the lawmakers?"21 (Italics supplied.)
In other words, and contrary to the dictum in the Baggott case,
it is a matter of ascertaining the legislature's intent, not the mere
presence or absence of a separability clause, which determines
the extent to which, if at all, valid portions of a statute will be
preserved when it is discovered that other provisions are invalid.
Insofar as the presence of such a clause is concerned and notwithstanding the statement that "we are bound to give effect to
the separability clause" the court clearly recognized a freedom
to ignore it, or others like it "in cases where the valid provisions
are so interwoven with and dependent upon the objectionable
matter that application of the separability clause would defeat
I

to 9, inclusive, of Article IX of the Constitution as providing the exclusive

procedure for impeachment of public officers with the result that statutory
provisions similar to that involved in the subject case-necessarily involving
the removal from public office in cases involving incumbents-are in conflict

with the constitutional provision, and hence, invalid.
19. 298 U. S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936).

20. State v. Gravolet, 168 La. 648, 123 So. 111 (1929) and State v. Dunson,
138 La. 131, 70 So. 61 (1915).

21. 298 U. S. 238, 312, 56 S.Ct. 855, 873, 80 L.Ed. 1160, 1189 (1936).
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rather than fulfill the purpose of enactment." This was, indeed,
the very result in the Carter case where the court after declaring
the labor provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 to be unconstitutional, found the price-fixing provisions to
be so related to and dependent upon the former as to require
them to fall notwithstanding the presence of a separability clause.
In the Baggott case, however, the court saw no "good reason why
two of the penalties, i.e., fine and imprisonment, cannot be retained without the other penalty. '22
This was the very observation which the court had refused
to make or even consider in the Dunson23 and Gravolet24 cases,
involving practically identical pieces of legislation, which it intimates, by dictum, in the subject case it will follow in the
future where no separability clauses are incorporated. It is submitted that the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Carter
case points in the other direction: "In statutes not containing a
separability clause, the independence of the valid portion of a
statute will be a principal indicia of the legislative intent that
' 25
the statute be separately enforced.

TAXATION

Federal Estate Tax-Apportionment in Intestacy
In a case of first impression the court at the last term in
Succession of Ratcliff1 concluded that the burden of the federal
estate tax in cases of intestate successions is to be apportioned
ratably among those sharing in the distribution of the estate pursuant to equitable principles made applicable by the provisions
of Article 21 of the Civil Code. Thus, the surviving wife, whose
share in the community property represented 5.82% of the net
estate of the decedent (the estate consisting principally of the
decedent's separate property) was compelled to acquiesce in the
deduction of an equivalent percentage of the federal estate tax
from her share of the community property. 2
22. It is to be noted that the legislature of 1946 had already met and

enacted Act 221 deleting the objectionable disfranchisement clause, thereby
giving a clear expression of its intent, but it is submitted that the same
conclusion could as reasonably have been reached without such action.
Indeed, the court itself acknowledged that such action merely "made more
apparent" what must have been a similar original intent.
23. State v. Dunson, 138 La. 131, 70 So. 61 (1915).
24. State v. Gravolet, 168 La. 648, 123 So. 111 (1929).
25. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack's 3 ed. 1943) § 2404.
1. 212 La. 563, 33 So. (2d) 114 (1947).
2. It is important to note that the specific situation in the RatcZiff case
will not occur in the future by virtue of the adoption of the Revenue Act
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Mrs. Ratcliff's objection to this disposition of the case is
readily understandable when the apparent facts are examined.
The net value of the community had been determined to be
slightly in excess of $100,000.00, and since her share (approximately $50,000.00) constituted only about 5% of the entire estate
(separate and community) it appears that the net estate for tax
purposes must have approximated $1,000,000.00. Such an estate
is taxed at a rate in excess of 25%, and under the court's decision
Mrs. Ratcliff's community interest, being charged with its proportionate share of the tax, was likewise diminished by that
amount. Counsel for Mrs. Ratcliff, observing that the tax on a
net estate of $50,000.00 (her share) is only slightly in excess of
10%, urged that her contribution be accordingly reduced. The
court saw no merit in the contention, saying:
"We think that the failure of counsel to discover the justice in requiring that the tax be shared proportionately by
all emanates from their unwillingness to recognize that there
is but one estate for federal taxation purposes and that the
tax is levied on the whole, i.e.-the community and separate
property. This being so, equitable principles demand that
the burden be divided between all persons sharing in the
estate in accordance with their respective interests. There
is no just way to apportion the tax burden by measuring it
by different rates."
There has been no doubt concerning the power of the state,
either through legislation or court decision,8 to determine the
ultimate apportionment of the burden of the federal tax, aside
from specific instances provided by Congress, 4 since the Supreme
of 1948 [Pub. L. No. 471, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 2, 1948)] repealing the
1942 amendments to the Estate Tax and particularly Section 811(e) (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code [26 U. S. C. A. § 811(e)(2)] which made necessary
the inclusion of a surviving spouse's share of community property in computing the gross estate of the decedent. Additionally, also, as a matter of

course, the tax burden will be borne ratably by the heirs in the normal case
since the net estate after deduction of taxes is distributed to the heirs in
the proportionate amounts fixed by the provisions of the Civil Code.

The

problem will persist, however, in those cases where the value of property
which has

been

the

subject

of non-testamentary

disposition during

the

decedent's lifetime is included in the gross estate as interests or rights of
the decedent within the broad scope of Sec. 811 of the Internal Revenue
Code. See Fleming, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes (1948) 43 Ill.

L. Rev. 153.
3. Fleming, supra note 2 at 155. See also Paul, Federal Estate and Gift
Taxation (1942) § 13.54.
4. Congress has pre-empted the field in cases involving insurance [I.R.C.
826 (c)] and property over which the decedent had a power of appointment
[I.R.C. 826 (d)].
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Court's decision in Riggs v. Del Drago,5 where Mr. Justice
Murphy, speaking for a unanimous court, observed that the federal act "did not undertake in any manner to specify who was
to bear the burden of the tax. Its legislative history indicates
clearly that Congress did not contemplate that the Government
would be interested in the distribution of the estate after the tax
was paid, and that Congress intended that state law should determine the ultimate thrust of the tax."6 The Louisiana court,
acknowledging the authority thus conferred upon it and observing that since "Louisiana has no express law on the subject, . . .
must apply equitable principles under Article 21 of the Civil
Code, ' 7 establishes a rule which appears to be proper both on
principle and authority.
Since cases of intestacy are relatively infrequent in the field
of estate taxation, and in view of the fact that the rule of the
Ratcliff case will have limited application in the few such cases
that do arise, 8 the broader question is presented, namely, whether
the court will apply the principle in cases involving testamentary
successions. The precise question, as previously indicated, has
9
never been adjudicated. The court's only two previous decisions
involving the federal estate tax both considered and rejected the
contention that the federal tax was in the nature of a "debt" to
be deducted from the estate before computing the state inheritance taxes, and neither was concerned with the problem of ap5. 317 U. S. 95, 63 S. Ct. 109, 87 L. Ed. 106, 142 A.L.R. 1131 (1942).
6. Congressman Cordell Hull, one of the supporters of the 1916 act and
its reputed draftsman, declared: "Under the general laws of descent the
proposed estate tax would be first taken out of the net estate before distribution, and distribution made under the same rule that would otherwise
govern it. Where the decedent makes a will he can allow the estate tax

to fasten on his net estate in the same manner, orif he objects to this equitable method of imposing it upon the entire net estate before distribution
he can insert a residuary clause or other provision in his will, the effect
of which would more or less change the incidence of the tax." 53 Cong.

Rec. 10657 (1916).
Congressman Kitchin, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Com-

mittee, stated: "We levy an entirely different system of Inheritance taxes.
We levy the tax on the transfer of the fiat or whole net estate. We do not
follow the beneficiaries and see how much this one gets and that one gets,
and what rate should be levied on lineal and what on collateral relations, but

we simply levy on the net estate. This also prevents the Federal Government, through the Treasury Department, going into the courts contesting
and construing wills and statutes of distribution." 53 Cong. Rec. app. p.
1942 (1916).
7. 212 La. 563, 570, n. 2, 33 So. (2d) 114, 116, n. 2 (1947).

8. See note 2, supra.
9. Succession of Gheens, 148 La. 1017, 88 So. 253, 16 A.L.R. 685 (1921)
and Succession of Henderson, 211 La. 707, 30 So. (2d) 809 (1948). See The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Taxation
(1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 195.
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portionment. The opinion in the first of these cases 0 does not
disclose whether it was a case of testate or intestate succession.
The second case, Succession of Henderson,," decided at the 19461947 term, was a case of testamentary succession in which the
residuary legatee apparently assumed that his legacy was required to bear the full burden of the federal tax, raised no issue
concerning its apportionment and unsuccessfully relitigated the
same issue which had been resolved in the earlier case. 12 Such
an assumption, if in fact it was so assumed,'1 3 may prove to have
been a costly one if the court ultimately applies the rule of
equitable apportionment in testamentary cases since the residuary legatee in that case, who unsuccessfully sought to avoid
the payment of $27,387.17 in state inheritance taxes, bore without protest the entire burden of $391,245.36 in federal estate taxes
although his legacies (both specific as well as residuary)
amounted only to approximately one-third of the entire estate.
Under the principle of apportionment the other legatees in the
succession could be made to shoulder two-thirds of that burden,
approximately $260,000.00, or nearly ten times the amount which
was involved in the litigated issue.
A review of the jurisprudence in other states discloses 4 that
the courts are divided on the question whether apportionment
will be required in the absence of statute specifically applicable
to the subject.
Those states which have adopted the rule of
apportionment by court decision have reasoned that where the
testamentary instrument is silent on the subject fundamental
considerations of equity and justice require each legatee to
assume his fair share of the tax burden rather than imposing
its full thrust upon the residuary legatee. Unless and until the
Louisiana legislature adopts a specific statute on the subject, the
mandate of Article 21 of the Civil Code, accorded controlling
force in intestate successions by the Ratcliff case, should, in the
writer's opinion, likewise be construed to require a similar apportionment of the tax burden in cases of testamentary succession.
10. Succession of Gheens, 148 La. 1017, 88 So. 253, 16 A.L.R. 685 (1921).
11. 211 La. 707, 30 So. (2d) 809 (1947).
12. Succession of Gheens, 148 La. 1017, 88 So. 253, 16 A.L.R. 685 (1921)N
13. The report is silent on this issue.
14. See Fleming, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes (1948) 43 I1.
L. Rev. 153.
15. At least eleven states have adopted such legislation, most of them
having been enacted in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in the
case of Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 63 S. Ct. 109, 87 L. Ed. 106, 142
A.L.R. 1131 (1942) which sustained the constitutionality of the New York
act. See Fleming, supra note 14, at 161.
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State License Tax
Two cases decided during the last term involved questions
arising under the General License Tax Law. 16
State v. Magnolia Packing Company7 was another instance
in which the court was required to determine whether a particular
business operation constituted manufacturing thereby entitling
it to exemption from the provisions of the license tax. 8 It was
there concluded that the defendant meat packer, 35% of whose
gross receipts were derived from sales of sausage and lard produced by it (conceded to constitute manufacturing operations),
was entitled to the manufacturers' exemption notwithstanding
the fact that the remaining 65% of gross receipts were derived
from the sale of fresh and cured meats resulting from the conversion of cattle and hogs. It was contended on behalf of the
taxing authorities that the latter operations did not constitute
manufacturing thus subjecting the defendant to tax liability for
that portion of its business. The court found it unnecessary to
decide whether this contention was tenable, and assumed for the
purpose of decision that it was. Relying upon the fact that the
two phases of defendant's operations were completely integrated
and that the admitted manufacturing portion was a substantial
one, it was concluded that the defendant was to be regarded as
a manufacturer.
The decision, which is the most recent addition to a considerable body of Louisiana jurisprudence on the subject, 9 appears
pioperly decided in view of the established policy of the state to
exempt manufacturers from occupational license taxation. The
court acknowledged that policy, indicating that it had been given
constitutional recognition during the period from 1879 to 1921,
and since the latter date has found expression in the statutes
themselves. Whether the policy itself is sound or desirable is,
of course, another question.
City of New Orleans v. W. Horace Williams Company20 was
a case arising under the occupational license tax ordinance
adopted by the City of New Orleans pursuant to the authority
16. La. Act 15 of 1934 (3 E.S.) as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8588
et seq.].
17. 213 La. 661, 35 So. (2d) 422 (1948).
18. La. Act 15 of 1934 (3 E.S.) § 17, as amended by La. Act 5 of 1935
(1 E.S.) § 1; La. Act 55 of 1936, § 1; La. Act 33 of 1938, § 1; La. Act 125 of
1940, § 1; La. Act 21 of 1942, § 1; La. Act 175 of 1944, § 8 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1947) § 8604].
19. The court in a footnote to its opinion cites thirteen previous cases
in which the same issue was resolved.
20. 212 La. 831, 33 So. (2d) 653 (1947).
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conferred by the state act.2 ' In that case the taxpayer unsuccessfully contended that the city was without power to levy a tax
upon the privilege of engaging in an occupation within its limits
to be measured by the gross earnings of the business-derived
from work performed outside as well as inside the city. The
terms of the ordinance left no room for doubt respecting the
extraterritoriality of its measure, expressly providing that the
license tax in question should be based upon gross receipts
"whether earned within or without the city. '22 Approximately
6/7 of the taxpayer's business for the year in question was performed outside New Orleans. However, no other municipal or
parochial corporation had sought to tax its activities and its principal and only permanent office was maintained in the city. No
federal questions were raised, the sole issue being whether under
applicable provisions of state law the city had exceeded its taxing authority.
Observing the only applicable restriction in the statute to
be that "all such license taxes shall conform to the provisions
of section 8 of article X of the constitution," and that the latter
merely provides that "No political subdivision shall impose a
greater license tax than is imposed for State purposes," the court,
concluded that territorial as well as quantitative equality was
contemplated and sustained the tax. Previous Louisiana cases
cited by defendant in support of its position were distinguished. 23
The opinion emphasizes the fact that the city is levying a tax
for the enjoyment of a privilege which is exercised within its
boundaries (that of maintaining a place of business) and that in
so doing it may measure the amount of the tax by the gross
receipts of the business regardless of the source without being
said to tax property beyond its territorial jurisdiction. On its
facts, tested by the applicable provisions of state law, the decision seems correct and finds support in the cases in other jurisdictions, the court referring to cases in Virginia and South Carolina.
Exempting New Industries From Taxation
Through Justice Fournet's able and well written opinion in
21. La. Act 15 of 1934 (3 E.S.) § 42, as amended; La. Act 2 of 1935 (3
E.S.) § 2; La. Act 10 of 1935 (4 E.S.) § 1; La. Act 429 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8631].
22. 212 La. 831, 33 So. (2d) 653, 654 (1947).
23. Of the several cases so relied upon and mentioned by the court,
City of Shreveport v. New York Life Ins. Co., 141 La. 360, 75 So. 80 (1917),

appeared to present the greatest difficulty, as It reached the opposite result
on facts which are practically indistinguishable.
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Edwards v. Town of Ponchatoula2 4 the court made it unmistakably clear that the tax exemption features available to new
industries by Section 22 of Article X of the State Constitution
are to be granted in strict compliance with the procedures therein
set forth and are not to be made the subject of barter and trade
as ordinary commodities of commerce. A corporation whose
original certificate of exemption issued by the State Board of
Commerce and Industry was about to expire contemplated expansion and approached the municipal authorities with the proposition that, in return for the enactment of an ordinance contracting the corporate limits in such a manner as to exclude its
properties therefrom, it would agree to expand its facilities, thus
affording additional employment opportunities, purchase certain
needed equipment for the city and make other payments and
improvements. Following a consideration of the proposal the
town council obliged by enacting the desired legislation and taxpayers (including another corporation) sued to have the ordinance set aside.
In his opinion Justice Fournet realistically reviews the facts,
concluding that the entire episode was a piece of taxation-gerrymandering and invalidated the ordinance as an attempted circumvention of the constitutional provision 25 requiring that proposals for the creation or extension of such exemption be submitted to a vote of affected property taxpayers. The decision is
indeed commendable.
III. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY

HarrietS. Daggett*
SUCCESSIONS
After a thorough and eminently fair survey of all the facts,
the court in Succession of David' found that the administrator,
though failing through ignorance to comply with many details
of legal procedure, had justly and honestly and attentively cared
for the involved estate. Furthermore, he had performed what the
court termed the "thankless task" with the consent and indeed,
at the earnest insistence of the heirs. Obviously, Article 1150,
24. 213 La. 116, 34 So. (2d) 394 (1948).
25. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 22.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 213 La. 707, 35 So. (2d) 465 (1948).

